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Summary
Human monitoring in the workplace, sometimes referred to as medical screen-
ing, is a collation of practices that focuses on the workers as an indicator that: 
1) disease may result on exposure to a toxic substance, radiation, or other trau-
mas (medical surveillance); 2) a toxic substance has been absorbed into the body
(biological monitoring); 3) a particular worker may be especially predisposed to
disease (genetic screening or other probes of sensitivity); and 4) a pre-clinical dis-
ease state exists, indicating that potentially harmful exposure has occurred
(genetic monitoring). These monitoring practices, especially when required or
carried out by a government agency or the employer, raise serious and complex
scientific, legal, and ethical concerns. This article focuses on the practice of
“genetic testing” that involves mainly types 3 and 4, i.e., those involving both
genetic screening for predisposition to disease, and genetic monitoring for indi-
cations of potential harm due to workplace exposure. However, the other two
types of monitoring may also be relevant. The article also constructs a philo-
sophic framework for: 1) examining the adequacy of law as an embodiment of
ethical values, and sound science, concerning the genetic testing of workers; and
2) identifying possible solutions to the attendant legal and moral dilemmas. In
the workplace, the analysis necessarily focuses on three sets of activities involv-
ing distinct participants: workers, employers, corporations, physicians – either
in-house or under contract – and the government. The sets of activities deserv-
ing separate consideration are: 1) requiring the worker to submit to monitoring
tests; 2) disseminating the results of the tests; and 3) using the test results.
Because the different kinds of monitoring address different stages of the path-
way from exposure to disease, and because what is monitored affects different
groups of workers differently, specification of exemplar problems and a
case-by-case analysis are essential, lest we face useless generalities at the end.
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Riassunto
Il monitoraggio degli individui in ambito lavorativo, talvolta definito screening
medico, è un insieme di procedure che si concentrano sui lavoratori, come indi-
cazione che: 1) una malattia può insorgere a seguito dell’esposizione ad una
sostanza tossica, a radiazioni, o ad altri traumi (sorveglianza medica); 2) una
sostanza tossica è stata assorbita dal corpo (monitoraggio biologico); 3) un sin-
golo lavoratore può essere particolarmente predisposto ad una malattia (scree-
ning genetico o altre prove di sensibilità); e 4) esiste uno stato preclinico di malat-
tia che indica l’avvenuta esposizione potenzialmente dannosa (monitoraggio
genetico). Queste pratiche di monitoraggio, specialmente quando richieste o ese-
guite da un’agenzia governativa o dal datore di lavoro, alimentano serie e com-
plesse preoccupazioni scientifiche, legali ed etiche. Questo articolo si concentra
sulla pratica del “test genetico” che coinvolge principalmente i suddetti punti 3
e 4, cioè sia lo screening genetico per indicare una predisposizione ad una malat-
tia, che il monitoraggio genetico per indicare un potenziale danno dovuto ad una
esposizione sul posto di lavoro. Però, anche gli altri due tipi di monitoraggio pos-
sono essere pertinenti. L’articolo costruisce anche una struttura filosofica per: 1)
un esame dell’adeguatezza della legge come fusione di valori etici e valide basi
scientifiche per quanto riguarda il monitoraggio genetico dei lavoratori e 2) l’i-
dentificazione di possibili soluzioni per gli annessi dilemmi legali e morali. Sul
posto di lavoro, l’analisi necessariamente si concentra su tre tipi di attività che
coinvolgono partecipanti distinti: lavoratori, datori di lavoro, sindacati, medici
— sia interni che sotto contratto esterno — e governo. I tipi di attività che meri-
tano considerazione separate sono: 1) la richiesta al lavoratore di sottoporsi a
esami di monitoraggio; 2) la diffusione dei risultati delle prove; e 3) l’utilizzo di
tali risultati. Poiché i diversi tipi di monitoraggio valutano diverse fasi del per-
corso dall’esposizione alla malattia, e poiché ciò che viene monitorato colpisce in
modo diverso gruppi diversi di lavoratori, la descrizione dettagliata di situazio-
ni modello ed un’analisi caso per caso sono essenziali per non trovarci di fronte
alla fine ad inutili generalizzazioni. 
Parole chiave: monitoraggio genetico, screening genetico, esame genetico, discri-
minazione, riservatezza 
Introduction
Biomonitoring of workers raises important scientific, ethical and legal concerns and
is usually done by, or at the instigation of, the employer who in law is responsible for
their health and safety. Whenever workplace monitoring leads to the exclusion of work-
ers from employment, removal of workers from certain jobs, or dismissal of workers,
difficult issues emerge affecting labour-management relations, labour law and discrimi-
nation law. The resulting legal and ethical questions are usually framed within the con-
text of the employment contract or relationship.
Human monitoring in the workplace, sometimes referred to as medical screening, is
a collation of practices (Table 1) that focuses on the workers as an indicator that: 1) dis-
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ease may result on exposure to a toxic substance, radiation, or other traumas (medical
surveillance); 2) a toxic substance has been absorbed into the body (biological monitor-
ing); 3) a particular worker may be especially predisposed to disease (genetic screening
or other probes of sensitivity); and 4) a pre-clinical disease state exists, indicating that
potentially harmful exposure has occurred (genetic monitoring). These monitoring prac-
tices, especially when required or carried out by a government agency or the employer,
raise serious and complex scientific, legal, and ethical concerns 1, 2. This article focuses
on the practice of “genetic testing” that involves mainly types 3 and 4, i.e., those involv-
ing both genetic screening for predisposition to disease, and genetic monitoring for indi-
cations of potential harm due to workplace exposure. However, the other two types of
monitoring may also be relevant.
The identification of DNA - or protein - carcinogen adducts, and other markers of
exposure to chemicals and their effects on health, raise new and challenging questions
for application of the emerging science of molecular epidemiology in the workplace. The
new science may well have relevance for chemical regulation, workers’ compensation,
and damage suits in the courts.
The legal and ethical problems of disease detection and the communication of infor-
mation in the context of the patient and personal physician relationship are thorny
enough: workplace monitoring complicates the issue even further. The article constructs
a philosophic framework for: 1) examining the adequacy of law as an embodiment of
ethical values, and sound science, concerning the genetic testing of workers, and 2) iden-
tifying possible solutions to the attendant legal and moral dilemmas. In the workplace,
the analysis necessarily focuses on three sets of activities involving distinct participants:
workers, employers, corporations, physicians – either in-house or under contract – and
the government. The sets of activities deserving separate consideration are: 1) requiring
the worker to submit to monitoring tests; 2) disseminating the results of the tests; and 3)
using the test results. Because the different kinds of monitoring address different stages
of the pathway from exposure to disease, and because what is monitored affects differ-
ent groups of workers differently, specification of exemplar problems and a case-by-case
analysis are essential, lest we face useless generalities at the end. 
Towards an ethical theory for human monitoring
The moral and legal enquiry in the area of human monitoring addresses the behaviour
of particular actors engaged in the decision to undertake monitoring tests, and in their
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Table 1 - Types of human monitoring
• Medical surveillance
– indicators of disease
• Biological monitoring
– indicators of the uptake or presence of toxic (or genotoxic) substances and/or their metabolites
• Genetic screening
– and other indicators of susceptibility
• Genetic monitoring
– pre-clinical manifestations of disease
design and conduct in the evaluation and dissemination of the test results, and in the use
of the information. Ladd3 argues that it is important to distinguish ethics from law, cus-
tom, institutional practices, and positive morality (the body of accepted popular beliefs
of a society about morality): ethics is concerned with what ought to be. Moral problems
emanating from conflicts concerning human monitoring may be categorized as: 1) con-
flicts arising from differences in legitimate interests of different actors/institutions; 2)
conflicts in moral and legal duties of each actor/institution; and 3) conflicts among
actors/institutions arising from different perceptions of what is right or wrong, fair or
unfair. In addition to conflicts, other problems arise during the various stages of moni-
toring activity, including the perennial problem of how much (information, safety, pre-
caution, etc.) is enough to justify intervention, and the difficulty of responding respon-
sibly to events and information when people are experiencing stress and misperception.
Certain rights are possessed by individuals, and those rights impose (moral) obliga-
tions on others. Rights and obligations must be viewed together in the context of partic-
ular relationships4. Ladd and others have argued that people have a general duty to sup-
port the fulfillment of the moral requirements of relationships, whether their own or
those of others. Some of what is necessary to carry out this duty is embodied in rights
and obligations, which may sometimes be given the force of law.
... the concept of rights, as a cluster of claims on society and its institutions on the
part of the individual, derives its principal moral warrant from the concept of moral
integrity. This concept, unlike the concept of simple self-determination, focuses on the
integrity of personal relationships, concerns, and responsibilities. Everyone in socie-
ty has a duty, individually and collectively, to defend, support, and nourish these
moral relationships both personally and in others. The concept of rights provides an
effective social and conceptual instrument for carrying out this general duty4.
The delineation of rights and duties gives rise to certain expectations or hopes on the
part of society concerning human behaviour. In imposing rules or legal principles on
individuals and institutions, the law often embodies societal attitudes, values, and
expectations. Sometimes, but not always, this occurs when a significant societal con-
sensus has been reached on a particular moral question derived from human conflicts.
The law establishes legal rights, whose violation may be illegal, and the law provides
remedies to correct their violation. But the law also recognizes that conflicts of legiti-
mate interests, conflicts of legal duties, and differences in perception of what is right or
wrong, fair or unfair, require a balancing in the fashioning of remedies. Indeed, there
are both legal remedies (usually of statutory origin) and equitable remedies that give
great discretionary power to the courts or adjudicating institutions, such as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in the United States. Rules are embodied in leg-
islation and regulations; legal principles guide, but do not unequivocally settle, other
conflicts. In examining of questions of conflict, the law does indeed view behaviour in
the context of relationships. Justifiable expectations which one party has of another are
translated into the legal concept of reliance. Thus, the law will sometimes find a physi-
cian-patient relationship between worker and company physician - when none was
intended by the physician - because it was reasonable that the worker expected certain
behaviour or transmission of information from the physician. Similarly, although the
legal construct of the modern corporation in many countries bestows limited personal
liability on corporate officers or employees5, the courts will “pierce the corporate veil”
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when corporate behaviour violates the ethical norm. Discrimination law is replete with
discretionary justice6.
The law, of course, does not always serve the ethical interests of the society so nobly.
Legislation and legal institutions can be compromised by powerful special interests. In
addition, if there is a lack of societal consensus or interest about a moral issue, the law
may either not address that issue or fail to give helpful guidance concerning the bound-
aries of fair or equitable behaviour. This is currently the case concerning the problems
encountered in both workplace and community monitoring. Thus, it is important to
engage in both a legal and ethical enquiry concerning human and institutional behaviour.
In the context of the transfer of medical information resulting from workplace mon-
itoring and discrimination resulting from its use, the legal and ethical norms are in a
great state of flux. Conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty (for example, for the com-
pany physician or government official) abound. Moreover, given the arguable scientif-
ic validity of many screening tests and of resulting data, questions of what actions to
take or not to take reflect differences in perceptions of fairness and risk-adverseness.
The worker would rather be safe and keep his or her job; the employer wants to limit
his or her legal and economic liability. In the face of great uncertainty, the actors pre-
fer to take few chances, so that very divergent solutions are pursued concerning both
the transmission of uncertain information and its use. On the other hand, some employ-
ers may be motivated to undertake medical screening solely out of a genuine concern
for the health of their employees and may even feel a moral obligation to do so. In this
case, there may be no conflict, if care is taken concerning the dissemination and use of
the monitoring results.
Scientific and ethical issues
The sources of human intra-individual and inter-individual variability having rele-
vance for the workplace environment range from the stochastic nature of differences
among humans to genetic, environmental and disease factors related or unrelated to a
particular place of employment (Table 2). 
The motivations behind using scientific information collected from genetic testing
reflect the different purposes for which that information might be used:
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Table 2 - Sources of human variability
• Stochastic
– epigenetic
• Genetic “predisposition”
– age/gender/race/specific genes
• Environmental factors
– Nutrition, diet and alcohol
– Smoking
– Other non-occupational exposures
– Endocrine disrupters
• Pre-existing disease
– Non-occupationally induced
– Prior occupationally induced
– to discover increased harm or risk of harm in a population of workers;
– to notify populations at risk;
– to control or regulate toxic substances or other exposures in order to protect at-risk
populations;
– to create or recognize a class eligible for compensation;
– to reduce
- actual harm to workers (and to their offspring);
- subsequent employer’s liability;
– to remove or reassign
- sensitive workers, 
- high-risk workers (and reduce risk to their offspring), 
– to treat/provide therapy or establish a basis for future monitoring or surveillance;
– to compensate individual workers.
Scientific and science policy considerations
Whether or not information is good enough (i.e., reliable enough) to be used for any of
these purposes depends, among other things, on whether the tests used have sufficient sen-
sitivity, specificity, and predictive value (positive or negative), and reproducibility1, 2. The
reader is reminded that, from a scientific perspective, unless the underlying frequency of a
condition or marker in a population is known in advance, no estimate can be made as to
the predictive value of the test on an individual worker or subject. Also important to rec-
ognize is that biomarkers often lack validation for field use1, 2, 7. Vineis, Schulte and
McMichael observe that:
Although rare and highly-penetrant mutations in cancer genes [with strong correla-
tion between the gene and the phenotype of interest] could act with no interaction
with external factors (for example by direct interference with basic mechanisms of
cell replications and differentiation), gene-environment interactions are intrinsic to
the mode of action of low-penetrant genes8.
For low-penetrant genes, a large number of workers would have to be screened in
order to prevent one cancer. Further,
…the proportion of diseases attributable to low-penetrant genetic traits is clearly dif-
ficult to establish and is probably much lower than the burden of disease to environ-
mental agents. … In general we can expect little from genetic screening of the popu-
lation, apart from limited groups (usually families) with a concentration of high-risk
mutations8.
…[Genetic monitoring] [t]ests for genetic damage in somatic cells have also been
misunderstood. …without assessment of predictive value, the marker will not be use-
ful in screening populations8.
In addition to these scientific issues, questions of science policy, reflecting the need
to achieve scientific consensus, arise regarding central technical considerations in the
adoption of testing protocols. They mirror the preferences of scientists and other
involved health professionals, but their determination is by no means ‘objective’.
Eur. J. Oncol. Library, vol. 4
38
– In investigatory or screening studies, what are appropriate threshold values for bio-
marker specificity, sensitivity, and predictive value?
– How are the normal reference ranges for biomarkers to be determined and how are
sensitive subgroups dealt with appropriately? 
– How can it be ensured that reference groups are sufficiently well-characterized for
known confounders? 
– Can agreement be reached on the cut-offs for categorization of the acceptability of
conducting future studies as unacceptable, justified and recommended?
– Can this be done independent of the purpose to which the information is to be put? 
– Does it matter whether the biomarker is a marker of exposure, susceptibility, or disease?
– What are similarly acceptable a priori values for investigations that research the
suitability of biomarkers for future applications?
– Are we ready to specify standards and quality assurance criteria for accuracy and
reproducibility of tests?
– What are acceptable participation rates in worker-based investigations? Can statis-
tical sampling of subjects be used in lieu of high participation rates for population-
based studies?
In addition to these considerations, there is an obvious preference for non-invasive
and non – dangerous (low-risk/high-benefit) methods. The study design should address
population- as well as individual-relevant information, inter- and intra-individual vari-
ability (all tests are only a snapshot in time) and, of course, accuracy and reliability.
Ethical and public policy considerations
From an ethical or public policy perspective, what constitutes sufficient reliability in
fact depends on the specific uses to which the information is put. Publishing biomoni-
toring results in a scientific journal generally requires more stringent limitations than
notifying populations at risk. Taking political or legal action may embody a precaution-
ary approach that relaxes the evidentiary basis for action9.
The extent to which workers are required by their employer to submit to monitoring
or tests, and the permissible dissemination and use of both individual and population-
based monitoring data by employers and government, are governed to some extent by
statutory and common law in the United States (see later discussion). The strictures
placed on independent researchers or investigators may not be so governed, and thus sig-
nificant ethical issues arise. They are enumerated below. Beyond compliance with law,
additional ethical issues arise when the employer or his/her contracted researchers/inves-
tigators conduct monitoring studies. 
A. Monitoring by independent researchers and investigators
Making ethical considerations an integral part of a biomonitoring study/research design
Ethical issues should be considered before planning, conducting, and using informa-
tion from a biomarker investigation. They include 1) recruitment methods, and 2) possi-
ble impacts on individuals and groups from the dissemination, and the use of, or failure
to make use of, the results obtained. These impacts could include implications for:
– reducing exposure;
– preventing, arresting, or treating disease;
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– improving health status; and 
– follow-up actions.
In addition, failure to think through the implications of a particular study could:
– inflict mental distress and adversely affect the psychological health of the subject-
participants and similarly-situated groups (of workers) as a result of publication of
the study;
– compromise the moral integrity of the subject-participants resulting from uncertain
and equivocal results.
If there is some significant risk of particular tests, what goes into the risk/benefit calculus?
– The benefits of the proposed study should not be overstated, nor the risks under-
stated (reflecting possible investigator bias).
– The proposed study might be classified as unacceptable, justified, or recommended.
– Distinction should be drawn between expected individual and population-based
validity (and hence benefit).
– Risks should include risk to employment status, in addition to impacts on physical
and mental health.
Recruiting the subject-participants
The recruitment of subjects should be undertaken:
– without an implied/false sense of benefit when none/little is expected;
– without under-representation of the risks (both safety and economic/social) of tests;
– without coercion stemming from
- displeasure of physicians/employers/fellow workers,
- concern with job security,
- fear of/actual withholding of benefits (treatment, compensation, etc.); 
– without creating adverse psychological effects and compromise of moral integrity;
– by having a clear agreement on the restricted uses of samples taken;
– with appropriate consideration of remuneration.
Concerns related to informed consent
– What are the essential elements of informed consent in the biomonitoring context?
– Is informed consent meaningful when there are great uncertainties attending risks
and/benefits?
– The positive and negative consequences (health and non-health) of both participa-
ting and not participating need to be divulged. 
– The anticipated uses of individual and group data should be explained.
– Is ‘decisional autonomy’ possible for trans-generational effects?
Notifying (disseminating the results to) the subject-participants
Results of the investigations need to be communicated in an understandable and com-
passionate manner:
– in a timely fashion;
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– after anticipating and planning an appropriate response to the possible impacts of
notification on subject-participants and on others who might be affected by the
information;
– along with awareness of/provision for more communication, information and
advice to affected persons;
– along with options for prevention, control, treatment of disease, and future moni-
toring.
Again, distinctions between individual risks and population-based risks have to be
clarified.
Disseminating the results to others
– How is the balance to be maintained for concerns with confidentiality and inform-
ing the subjects’ physician, family, employer, and fellow workers? 
– Even population-based information can be damaging to privacy interests of indi-
vidual workers. 
– Are different answers forthcoming for biomarkers of exposure versus susceptibili-
ty versus disease?
– Distinction might be drawn between ex post and ex ante consent required for pub-
lication of the study results. Ex ante consent may not be truly informed consent.
Subject relate differently to the results of an actual study, than to some hypothetical
description of expected results.
Commitments to follow-up activities
– Those undertaking the investigations have to be prepared to take follow-up action
or to assist in securing commitments from others. 
– How far do these commitments go? 
– Are they to be restricted to expected results of the investigations or do they extend
to unanticipated results?
Securing the participation of the subjects in all aspects of monitoring
– Ethical principles would seem to dictate the participation of subjects (individually
or through their representatives or nominees) in decisions preceding, during and fol-
lowing the actual study, i.e., in the choice of what is to be monitored, the design of
the protocol, the choice of the investigator, the actual conduct of the study, the eval-
uation of the results, the dissemination of the results, the decisions to act upon those
results and the actions themselves. 
– Vehicles to enable and empower subject-participants include:
- The subject choices of professionals as investigators, evaluators, or technical
observers
- The use of management-labour health and safety committees
– The earlier key actors are involved in the process, the more effectively can adverse
effects and loss of trust be avoided or minimized
An in-depth exploration of these value-laden questions and issues is beyond the scope
of this paper. The reader is referred to other thoughtful commentaries for further discus-
sion8, 10-14.
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B. Monitoring by the employer or his researchers and investigators
In addition to the ethical issues that should be considered by independent researchers
and investigators, it is argued that employer-sponsored studies have an ethical obligation
to ensure that:
– actions taken as a result of monitoring reduce both individual and total harm;
– environmental monitoring is also used;
– resources are not diverted from redesigning cleaner and inherently safer technology;
– medical removal protection is provided for earnings and job security, even if not
required by law. 
Legal challenges in work-related genetic testing in the United States
Legal problems and challenges related to genetic testing arise in the context of 1)
requiring workers to submit to monitoring, 2) dissemination of monitoring results/data,
3) the employer’s use of monitoring results, and 4) the use of monitoring data in tort and
workers’ compensation cases. These are explored below.
Requiring workers to submit to human monitoring
Personal privacy is an important issue. In the abstract sense, an employee may always
refuse to be the subject of human monitoring. Thus the US Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), the US National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), and the employer have no authority to compel employees to cooper-
ate. Refusal to participate, however, may mean loss of a job, so that the relevant enquiry
is the extent to which the employer may predicate employment on such cooperation. For
example, may an employer require a prospective employee to submit to genetic or bio-
logic screening as a precondition to employment? May he or she require a current
employee to submit to periodic biologic monitoring or medical surveillance? These
questions raise important issues of confidentiality and discrimination. Apart from these
issues, however, the question of the employer’s general authority to require human mon-
itoring of employees needs to be considered.
Monitoring in response to agency directive
At the outset, a distinction must be made between the human monitoring that
OSHA, NIOSH, or the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may require and
the monitoring that the employer implements on his or her own initiative. When a fed-
eral agency requires that monitoring be done, the worker has a valid objection only if
he or she asserts a statutory or constitutional violation. The US Congress was mindful
of constitutional considerations in developing human monitoring programmes. For
example, it specifically acknowledged the need for a balancing of interests when an
employee asserted a religious objection to a monitoring procedure. Human monitoring
can also impinge on the worker’s constitutional right to privacy. In the case of human
monitoring, the right to privacy may be articulated in two ways: the right to physical
privacy, and the right to withhold information likely to prove detrimental to one’s
self-interest.
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If an employee does not wish to comply with a monitoring procedure required by
agency regulation, imposing that procedure as a condition of employment may invade
that employee’s constitutional right to physical privacy. Depending on the nature of the
procedure, it may infringe the right to be free from unwelcome physical intrusions and
the right to make decisions regarding one’s own body. Although these rights are obvi-
ously related, the former is grounded in the fourth amendment’s proscription against
unreasonable search and seizure, whereas the latter is closely associated with the rights
of personal privacy commonly identified with the ninth and tenth amendments. Although
protected by the US Constitution, these rights of privacy are not inviolate.
US courts have recognized a general need to balance the privacy interests of the indi-
vidual with the public health interests of society. In certain situations, the former will be
deemed to outweigh the latter, but in others, intrusion will be permitted in the name of
public health. To date, no reported judicial decision has mentioned an asserted constitu-
tional right to refuse participation in human monitoring as a condition of employment.
Nevertheless, one can identify the factors that would bear upon an evaluation of that right.
The public health significance of human monitoring, when properly used, is difficult
to deny. Gathering information through human monitoring to develop standards for the
protection of workers’ health, or for the enforcement or evaluation of existing standards,
serves an important public health purpose. Furthermore, although the US Constitution
protects against government paternalism, the fact that this public health interest parallels
the affected worker’s own interest in a healthy workplace may make monitoring a less
onerous invasion of privacy than it would be otherwise (indeed, Bayer15 raises the ques-
tion of whether workers may actually have a moral obligation to cooperate in such mon-
itoring for the collective good. He argues that without safeguards, coercive monitoring
is unfair). To the extent that monitoring serves a legitimate public health purpose, a lim-
ited intrusion of physical privacy appears constitutionally permissible. The less the accu-
racy, reliability, or predictive value of a particular intrusion, however, the weaker the
case for violating physical privacy.
At some point, the degree of risk or intrusiveness of monitoring may be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the public health interests. Some forms of human monitoring
may simply be too risky or too intrusive to be constitutionally permissible. Furthermore,
even if a monitoring procedure is not constitutionally impermissible per se, the worker
may have a right to insist on an alternative, less intrusive procedure that adequately ful-
fills public health purposes. To survive constitutional challenge, a regulation requiring
human monitoring should be reasonably related to a legitimate public health goal and
should impose the least intrusive method necessary to achieve that goal.
An additional and critical question is whether the employee may refuse to participate
in a programme of agency-directed monitoring when he or she believes that the employ-
er may use the resulting information as a basis for termination of employment. For
example, the worker who suffers chromosomal damage as a result of workplace expo-
sure may fear that medical screening will reveal this condition to the employer and thus
induce job loss or reassignment (i.e. removal). Thus, participation in a monitoring pro-
gramme can be tantamount to self-incrimination.
This form of self-incrimination conflicts with the right to personal privacy. If there is
a constitutional right to preserve the confidentiality of information pertaining to one’s
health, there may also be a right to retain that information within one’s body. Stated dif-
ferently, there may be a limited constitutional right to refuse to comply with physical
procedures that result in the initial disclosure of confidential information. Although this
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right is not absolute, damage to the employee can be substantial if health data are likely
to affect employment status adversely. A worker’s interest in preserving his employment
status may rise to the level of property protected by the Fifth Amendment.
In developing monitoring requirements, an agency should seriously consider the con-
stitutional dimensions of human monitoring. To avoid a challenge on a self-incrimina-
tion basis, OSHA and NIOSH might consider including mandatory Medical Removal
Protection (MRP) programmes as part of their human monitoring requirements. MRP
provides earnings protection and employment security during medical removal. Properly
used, an MRP programme would help to ensure employee cooperation with monitoring.
Monitoring in the absence of agency directive
Under common law, employers can require their employees to comply with reason-
able programmes of human monitoring. The US Congress did not intend the
Occupational and Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) to “preempt the field” by authoriz-
ing the implementation of human monitoring requirements. One of the Act’s express
purposes is to “stimulate employers ... to institute new and to perfect existing programs
for providing safe and healthful working conditions”. Congress intended that employers
take the initiative on a number of fronts, including human monitoring, in developing
health and safety programmes. As long as it promotes “safe and healthful working con-
ditions”, employer-initiated human monitoring would appear to be allowed. However,
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, passed by the Senate and await-
ing action by the House, or its successors, would appear to significantly limit these
efforts in the case of genetic testing (see the discussion below). Nothing in the OSHAct
precludes employers who are subject to OSHA monitoring requirements from imple-
menting additional programmes. Further, it could be argued that employers have a moral
obligation to initiate monitoring if they suspect their employees are at risk. To date, how-
ever, this moral obligation has not been translated into a legally enforceable duty to
undertake medical screening.
If an employer institutes a human monitoring programme in the absence of agency
directive, he or she is still subject to applicable restrictions under state common law, state
statute, and federal labour law. Common law requires that human monitoring be imple-
mented in a reasonable fashion. Determining reasonableness involves balancing the ben-
efits gained by monitoring against the risk, discomfort, and intrusiveness of the moni-
toring procedure. The US National Labor Relations Act may also require such balanc-
ing. In a given jurisdiction, the balance might be affected by a state statute defining a
right of personal privacy.
Informed consent is also an important issue in the context of workplace monitoring.
Assuming that a human monitoring programme is permissible, there are limitations on
the manner in which an employer may implement the programme. In general, one who
undertakes the performance of monitoring procedures has a duty to perform those pro-
cedures properly and will face liability for damages caused by the negligent administra-
tion of a monitoring procedure.
A troublesome question arises, however, with regard to the applicability of the doctrine
of informed consent. Strictly speaking, informed consent is a medico-legal concept, and
stems from a belief that persons have a right to make decisions governing their bodies and
health. Thus, a medical professional is said to have a duty to inform the patient honestly
and accurately of the potential risks and benefits of a proposed medical procedure so that
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the patient can make an informed choice whether to consent to that procedure. All human
monitoring procedures are medical or quasi-medical in nature. Commonly, they are per-
formed by medical professionals: physicians, physician assistants, nurses, or nurse prac-
titioners. Thus, the concept of informed consent appears at first glance to be applicable.
The differences between human monitoring and medical treatment, however, are not
insignificant, and they raise serious questions as to whether and to what extent the tradi-
tional doctrine of informed consent has meaning in the occupational setting.
Initially, one may enquire to what extent the relationship between the worker and the
medical professional who administers the monitoring procedure can be characterized as
a physician-patient relationship. Quite often, neither the employee nor the workers’
union selects the occupational physician. Rather, the employer selects and often direct-
ly employs the physician. Accordingly, some courts have held that the performance of a
physical examination, which would clearly establish a physician-patient relationship in
a purely medical context, does not create that relationship if it is a pre-employment
examination requested by the prospective employer. To the extent that the
physician-patient relationship does not exist in the occupational setting, traditional
notions of informed consent may not be applicable to human monitoring.
Similarly, the doctrine of informed consent is tied closely to the concept of medical
treatment. It assumes that not only is the patient being requested to submit to a proce-
dure designed for his or her own benefit, but also that the patient is in a position to make
a voluntary choice to participate. Human monitoring calls both of these assumptions into
question. Monitoring may not be “treatment” in the conventional sense of the word. In
many cases, monitoring benefits the employer more than the employee. Furthermore,
monitoring is usually compulsory in that it is a condition of continued employment. It
may be meaningless to speak of “informed consent” if the worker/patient is not free to
reject the proffered procedure without jeopardizing his job. In this light, the applicabili-
ty of informed consent appears particularly dubious in the case of agency-directed mon-
itoring. Neither the employee nor the employer has the discretion to discontinue moni-
toring.
Regardless of the applicability of informed consent in the traditional sense, a com-
plete and accurate disclosure of risks seems an advisable adjunct to a programme of
human monitoring. Whether or not a physician-patient relationship exists, imposing a
medical procedure on a person not fully informed of the risks of that procedure may still
be regarded as a physical battery and may give rise to liability in tort. In addition, pru-
dent social policy requires full disclosure of risks. If the employer is required to disclose
all risks inherent in a programme of human monitoring, employee and union scrutiny
will act as an incentive for the employer to develop programmes that use the safest and
least intrusive techniques possible. Indeed, unions may have a right to demand such
information as a part of the collective bargaining process. Recognition of a duty to dis-
close material risks seems as appropriate in the area of human monitoring as it is in the
area of medical treatment.
An important question concerns the scope of the required disclosure of procedural
risks. The employer should, of course, disclose all material physical risks. The most sig-
nificant risk of all, however, may be dismissal from employment. Should employers or
occupational physicians be required to warn employees that one of the risks of submit-
ting to a programme of human monitoring may be the loss of jobs? The Code of Ethical
Conduct16 adopted in 1976 by the American Occupational Medical Association and the
American Academy of Occupational Medicine states that physicians should:
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... treat as confidential whatever is learned about individuals served, releasing infor-
mation only when required by law or by over-riding public health considerations, or
to other physicians at the request of the individual according to traditional medical
ethical practice; and should recognize that employers are entitled to counsel about
the medical fitness of individuals in relation to work, but are not entitled to diagnoses
or details of a specific nature.
Under this formulation, although the physician may not disclose to the employer the
specific results of human monitoring, the employee’s job security may be endangered
nonetheless. Employers are “entitled to counsel about the medical fitness of individuals
in relation to work”. A preferable alternative practice17 would involve the worker in such
discussions between the physician and the employer.
Title II (Employment) of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, apply-
ing to private-sector employers with 15 or more employees, was passed by the Senate and
…would prohibit employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and joint
labor-management committees from using genetic information to discriminate
against an individual through hiring, firing, or other employment decisions.
Employers are also prohibited from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic
information of employees. The genetic information protected extends to the employ-
ee, his or her spouse and all of their blood relatives, as well as adopted children.
Employers who obtain genetic information about their employees inadvertently,
through compliance with other laws (such as the Family and Medical Leave Act) or
through certain efforts to preserve employee health (such as employee wellness pro-
grams or monitoring of biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace) would
not be penalized unless they used such information to discriminate against the
employee…18 (emphasis added).
In addition to prohibiting the requiring or accessing of genetic information of employ-
ees, dissemination and discriminatory use of genetic information is also prohibited (see
the discussion below). 
Dissemination of monitoring results
Employee’s right of access
An employer may not limit or deny an employee access to his or her medical or expo-
sure records. The OSHA regulation promulgated on May 23, 1980 grants employees a
general right of access to medical and exposure records kept by their employer.
Furthermore, it requires the employer to reserve and maintain these records for an
extended period of time (in the absence of OSHA regulation, employees would arguably
still have a right of access under common law or state statute in many jurisdictions19).
There appears to be some overlap in the definition of “medical” and “exposure” records,
because both may include the results of biologic monitoring. The former, however, is
generally defined as those records pertaining to “the health status of an employee”,
while the latter is defined as those pertaining to “employee exposure to toxic substances
or harmful physical agents”.
The employer’s duty to make these records available is a broad one. The regulations
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provide that upon any employee’s request for access to a medical or exposure record,
“the employer shall assure that access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and man-
ner, but in no event later that fifteen (15) days after the request for access is made”. In
addition to the right of access, there are duties to inform workers of exposure to occu-
pational hazards20.
Employees’ right to confidentiality
Of all of the issues raised by human monitoring, employee confidentiality may have
received the most attention21. An employee’s right to maintain the confidentiality of
information regarding his body and health places a significant limitation on the ways in
which others can use that information. As programmes of human monitoring are devel-
oped, mechanisms must be found that maximize both the employee’s interest in privacy
and society’s interest in promoting general workplace health and safety. In the final
analysis, this may be more a technologic challenge than a legal or ethical one.
In a broad sense, private citizens do have a right to protect the confidentiality of their
personal health information. With regard to governmental invasions of privacy, this right
is created by the US Bill of Rights and is one component of the right of personal priva-
cy discussed previously. With regard to private intrusions, the right is grounded in state
law. In the medical setting, it grows out of the confidential nature of the
physician-patient relationship, although rights of confidentiality exist outside this rela-
tionship as well. In essence, the recognition of a right of privacy reflects an ongoing soci-
etal belief in the need to protect the integrity of the individual.
This right to privacy, however, is not absolute and may be limited or waived. US
courts nonetheless remain vigilant in their attempts to protect individual privacy. They
generally look for a reasonable middle ground when faced with legitimate interests on
both sides of the confidentiality question. They prefer an approach that permits both the
use of health information for a socially useful purpose and the protection of the privacy
of the individual. The key is the development of information-based technology that will
make that approach more readily available.
Title II (Employment) of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 pro-
hibits disclosure of genetic information except to the employee, health researchers, or in
compliance with federal and state law18.
Notification of workers at high risk
Caldart22 and Ashford and Caldart23 have addressed the worker’s right to information
and the employer’s duty to provide information concerning occupational risks without
request. Recently, there has been increasing attention to the government’s responsibility
to notify workers if they have been identified as being part of a high-risk group based on
epidemiologic studies. The reader is referred to the excellent works of Schulte et al 24-26,
which deal with the multitude of legal and ethical problems arising out of the
right-to-know.
Employer’s use of human monitoring results
Even if an employer obtains human monitoring data through a legitimate exercise of
his right of access, the right to use such data is not absolute. In the United States,
N.A. Ashford: Scientific, ethical and legal challenges in genetic testing
47
employers may not use health information to discriminate against employees on a basis
deemed impermissible by federal or state law. Beyond discrimination, however, a more
essential – and perhaps more difficult – question arises: to what extent may an employ-
er use health or exposure information to limit or terminate the employment status of an
individual employee or to deny employment to a prospective employee? Further, to what
extent and under what conditions does the employer have an obligation to remove the
worker? If removing a worker and rotating another employee to take his or her place
reduces each worker’s individual risk but increases the total number of diseased work-
ers, what is the employer to do?
Common law limitations
In early common law (court-developed law through successive cases), an employer
had the right to take an employee’s health into account in determining whether to con-
tinue to employ that person. If the employment contract was “open”, with no definite
term, the employee could be discharged for any reason, including health status, at the
will of the employer. If the contract of employment was for a definite term, the employ-
ee could be discharged for “just cause”. Typically, significant illness or disability con-
stituted “just cause”. Although federal labour law, workers compensation, and recent
common law limitation on the doctrine of “employment at will” have profoundly affect-
ed the nature of employee-employer relations in this century, courts continue to recog-
nize an employer’s interest in discharging employees who cannot perform their work
safely. Thus, if the worker has no statutory or contractual protection, an employer may
retain a general common law right to discharge the worker whose health status makes
continued employment dangerous, or whose health status prevents him from performing
his or her job. Workers compensation legislation, of course, facilitates termination of the
jobs of permanently disabled workers.
Human monitoring, however, places the issue in a somewhat different light.
Monitoring designed to reveal whether an employee has been, or in the future may be,
harmed by workplace hazards raises the question of whether the employer may dis-
charge an employee merely because the employee was, or may be, harmed by a situation
created by the employer. The rights of the employer to discharge the employee might not
be as broad then as in the general case.
Suppose an employer is complying with an existing OSHA standard for a particular
toxic exposure, and monitoring reveals that one of the firm’s employees is likely to suf-
fer serious or irreparable health damage unless he or she is removed from the workplace.
In this situation, the employer is complying with public policy as enunciated by OSHA
and, in the absence of a mandatory MRP provision, is arguably free to discharge the
employee. If an employer fails to comply with applicable OSHA standards, however, or
if no standard exists, and the employer permits workplace exposure levels that violate
state and federal requirements to maintain a safe place of employment, then the employ-
er is violating the public policy embodied in the OSHAct. Workers are only infrequent-
ly able to obtain compensation for disability due to occupational disease. In this case, to
permit the employer to discharge the employee is to permit a further violation of public
policy. An employer’s use of human monitoring data for this purpose may well be imper-
missible as a matter of public policy, and employers may be obliged by common law to
find safe assignments for the workers at comparable pay or bear the costs of their
removal.
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Limitations under the OSHAct general duty clause
The use of monitoring data to limit or deny employment opportunities raises other
issues under the general duty clause of the OSHAct. When monitoring information
reveals that an employee risks serious health damage from continued exposure to a
workplace toxicant, it may also indicate that the employer is in violation of the general
duty clause. When a workplace exposure constitutes a recognized hazard likely to cause
death or serious physical harm, an employer violates the general duty clause if he or she
does not take appropriate steps to eliminate the hazard. In the case of a toxic substance,
this would appear to require reduction of the exposure, not mere removal of presump-
tively sensitive employees from the site of exposure.
The issue is amenable to regulatory solution. The implementation of mandatory MRP
for toxic substances exposure in general, as OSHA has done with its lead standard27
might be accomplished by a generic MRP standard. An employer’s compliance with a
mandatory MRP provision for a particular exposure would remove the threat of a gen-
eral duty clause citation.
Limitations under the anti-discrimination laws
In addition to potential liability under the common law and the OSHAct general duty
clause, an employer who uses monitoring information to limit employment opportuni-
ties may also face liability under antidiscrimination laws. Although not all workplace
discrimination is prohibited, US state and federal laws forbid certain bases for discrimi-
nation. Many of these may apply to an employer’s use of human monitoring informa-
tion. A detailed discussion of the relevant discrimination laws is beyond the scope of this
article, but an outline of their potential impact on human monitoring follows.
Section 11(c) of the OSHAct prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise dis-
criminating against any employee “because of the exercise by such employee on behalf
of himself or others of any right afforded by this chapter”. If an employee insists on
retaining his job in the face of medical data indicating that continued exposure to a work-
place toxicant will be likely to pose a danger to health, the employee may well be assert-
ing a right afforded by the OSHAct. The Act’s general duty clause imposes on employ-
ers a duty to maintain a workplace that is free of “recognized hazards” likely to cause
death or serious physical harm. Inferentially, then, the Act vests employees with a con-
comitant right to insist that their workplace be free of such hazards. By insisting on
retaining employment, the employee is asserting his right to a workplace that comports
with the requirements of the general duty clause. Accordingly, an employer who dis-
charges or otherwise discriminates against a worker because of perceived susceptibility
to a toxic exposure arguably violates the prohibition of section 11(c). When an employ-
er asserts that an employee cannot work without injury to health, the employer tacitly
admits that the workplace is unsafe. That admission triggers the remedial provisions of
the OSHAct.
An OSHA regulation, issued under section 11(c) and upheld in an unanimous US
Supreme Court decision28, gives individual workers a limited right to refuse hazardous
work when there is a situation likely to cause “serious injury or death”29. The employer
may not take discriminatory action against the employee by discharging the employee or
by issuing a reprimand to be included in the employment file. According to the district
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court to which the issue was remanded for consideration, withholding the employee’s
pay during the period in which the employee exercises the right is also prohibited.
As a worker may be absent from a hazardous work assignment under certain condi-
tions without loss of pay or job security, it seems anomalous to allow an employer to dis-
charge or remove the employee without pay because of the same hazardous condition.
This would make the employee’s status depend on whether he or she asserted a right to
refuse hazardous work before the employer took action to discharge him from employ-
ment.
While these legal safeguards would seem to go some way in offering protection to
workers, in the case where monitoring or screening involves genetic information, Title
II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 explicitly provided that the
bill:
…would prohibit employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and joint
labor-management committees from using genetic information to discriminate
against an individual through hiring, firing, or other employment decisions…
Penalties for violation of the law are those available under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin [see below]. The procedures and remedies under the bill are the same
as under current law. Employees who believe they have a claim must make a com-
plaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the appropriate
state agency. The EEOC will investigate the claim and bring suit on behalf of the
employee if evidence of a violation is found. The EEOC also may pursue mediation if
the employer and employee agree to that option. In cases in which the EEOC choos-
es not to bring suit, the employee may bring suit independently. Penalties for Title VII
violations include reinstatement, back pay, injunctive relief, equitable relief and attor-
ney’s and expert witness fees.
No charges may be filed for “disparate impact” discrimination, which is not an inten-
tional diverse employment action but a discriminatory effect on a protected class
caused by an employment practice or policy that appears to be nondiscriminatory.
The bill would direct a commission to be formed six years after the bill’s enactment
to report on the possibility of allowing disparate impact claims18.
The only outright federal prohibition against employee discrimination based on
genetic information is Executive Order 13145 issued in 2000 which prohibits such dis-
crimination in federal employment.
Handicap discrimination
Employees may be able to assert further rights against discriminatory use of human
monitoring data under laws protecting the handicapped/disabled. US Congress and most
states have passed laws barring discrimination against handicapped/disabled individuals
in certain employment situations. The laws, which vary widely among the jurisdictions,
all place potential limitations on the use of human monitoring data. Although the courts
have adopted a case-by-case approach, the worker who is denied employment opportu-
nities on the basis of monitoring results often falls within the literal terms of many hand-
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icap discrimination statutes. In general, two issues will be determinative regarding dis-
ability: whether the workplace in question is covered by a state or federal handicap act;
and if so, whether the worker in question is handicapped/disabled under the act.
Until recently, the general applicability of handicap/disability discrimination statutes
to the use of human monitoring information in general remained unclear. However, a
recent case brought before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)30
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 would seem to have settled
the matter in the federal courts with regard to genetic information31, 32. In a genetic test-
ing discrimination suit against an employer secretly testing its employees for a rare
genetic condition associated with carpel tunnel syndrome, the EEOC sent a clear mes-
sage that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was intended to cover genetic test-
ing of existing employees, and other medical tests33, and that employers “shall not
require a medical examination… unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with job necessity”.
In 2002, in a case involving an individual with occupationally-caused musculoskele-
tal impairments who claimed she was substantially limited in performing manual tasks,
housework etc, the Supreme Court restricted the reach of the ADA, holding that the def-
initional terms in the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding stan-
dard for qualifying as disabled”34, 35. Putting these two cases together gives mixed
results. While genetic and other medical tests are covered by the ADA, what character-
istics qualify as an impairment – or might be regarded as an impairment – under the
ADA has been greatly narrowed in the federal context. However, state courts in several
states have rejected the federal narrowing of the ADA and interpret state disability laws
more favourably for disabled workers34. 
Examining the definitional criteria in the federal act, on which many – perhaps most
– of the state statutes are based, will illustrate the issues facing courts, and the potential
range of logical interpretations. The US National Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well as
the ADA of 1990 define a handicapped/disabled individual as “any person who (i) has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment”.
In the great majority of cases, persons facing reduced employment opportunities as a
result of human monitoring data do not presently have a substantially debilitating med-
ical condition and thus do not satisfy either the first or second clauses of the federal def-
inition. Rather, they are perceived as having an increased risk of developing such a con-
dition in the future. The Act seems designed primarily to protect the seriously handi-
capped, but its wording is broad enough to cover discriminatory practices based on data
obtained through human monitoring.
Even in cases in which handicap/disability discrimination is established, an employ-
er may escape liability if the discriminatory practice is reasonably necessary for efficient
operation of the business. The US National Rehabilitation Act provides employers with
no affirmative defense, but does require the handicapped/disabled individual to prove
that he is “qualified” for the job. Thus, if a handicap/disability prevents a worker from
safely or effectively performing the job, an exclusionary practice may be permissible
under the Act. Most state handicap statutes include some form of affirmative defense.
Although these vary among jurisdictions, many appear analogous to the familiar defens-
es that have developed under Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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Civil rights and age discrimination
Employers who exclude workers on the basis of monitoring information may also run
afoul of the more general laws against discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin. The scope of the Act is substantially broader than that of the federal handicap
discrimination act, and it affords protection for the great majority of American employ-
ees. In addition, many states extend similar protection to employees not covered by the
federal act. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and some state acts pro-
vide protection of comparable breadth against discrimination on the basis of age.
As with handicap discrimination, until recently the applicability of these laws to the
use of human monitoring information was unclear. In a 1998 case involving genetic test-
ing in the workplace, administrative employees were secretly tested for their propensity
to develop sickle cell anaemia during a pre-employment examination36. The US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that employees’ claims based on invasion of privacy
grounds might go to trial, but not those barred on the ADA32. 
Even if not intended as discrimination, the practical impact of an exclusionary practice
may fall disproportionately on a particular race, sex, ethnic or age group. The US
Supreme Court has long held that a claim of disparate impact states a viable cause of
action under the Civil Rights Act. A similar rationale has been applied in the area of age
discrimination. In a 1975 decision, the Court held that job applicants denied employment
on the basis of a pre-employment screen can establish a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination if they demonstrate that “the tests in question select applicants for hire or pro-
motion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants”.
Proof of disparate impact thus requires statistical analysis demonstrating a “significantly”
disproportionate effect on a protected class. The cases provide no clear guidance, howev-
er, as to the level of disproportion that is required before an effect is deemed significant.
The potential for disparate impact is inherent in many uses of human monitoring data.
A genetic screen for sickle-cell anaemia, for example, will disproportionately exclude
blacks and certain ethnic groups because they have a much higher incidence of this trait
than does the general population. Similarly, tests that consistently yield a higher per-
centage of positive results in one gender than the other may give rise to exclusionary
practices that discriminate on the basis of sex. The permissibility of foetus protection
policies, which exclude women of child bearing capacity from the workplace to avoid
exposure to reproductive hazards, is beyond the scope of this article, as it does not
involve discrimination on the basis of monitoring data; for a brief discussion of this
issue, see Ashford and Caldart20.
Finally, a wide variety of exclusionary practices based on monitoring data may have
a disparate impact on older workers. Older workers are likely to have been in the work-
force longer and usually have been exposed to hazardous work environments much more
often than their younger colleagues. Their prior exposure may have impaired their health
or left them more vulnerable to current workplace hazards. They may, for example, have
a preexisting illness as a result of previous workplace exposures or on account of age
alone.
Interestingly, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 provides that
“no charges may be brought for disparate impact discrimination” based on genetic
information, reserving that issue for the deliberations of a Commission to be established
6 years after the act goes into effect18.
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When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer
will have an opportunity to justify the alleged exclusionary practice by showing that its
use constitutes a “business necessity”. If such a showing is made, the practice will with-
stand a charge of disparate impact discrimination. The US Supreme Court has charac-
terized the defence of business necessity as requiring “a manifest relation to the
employment in question”. In the words of an often-cited opinion, this means that the
practice must be “necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business”. Further,
if the plaintiff can establish that another, less discriminatory practice will accomplish the
same purpose, the defence of business necessity will not stand.
The defence of business necessity is available only in cases of disparate impact. If a
practice is discriminatory on face value or involves disparate treatment, the employer
may avoid liability only by demonstrating that the basis of the discrimination constitutes
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). This defence is available under the Civil
Rights Act for discrimination based on sex, national origin, or religion (but not for dis-
crimination based on race or colour) and under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. The BFOQ defence requires the employer to establish that the discriminatory prac-
tice is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of business”. The US Supreme
Court has characterized the defence as an “extremely narrow” one. 
There are two principal reasons why business necessity may be difficult to establish
for exclusionary practices based on human monitoring data. The first is that most of
these practices are not designed to protect the health and safety of the public or of other
workers. Instead, their business purpose is the protection of the excluded worker and, not
incidentally, the protection of the employer from the anticipated costs associated with the
potential illness of that worker37. That position may well encounter a chilly judicial
reception. As noted in one analysis, “the courts are usually skeptical of an employer’s
argument that it refuses to hire qualified applicants for their own good, and they often
require a higher level of justification in these cases than in cases in which public safety
is at stake” 38. Another, and potentially more serious, obstacle to the successful assertion
of a defence of business necessity is the unreliability of the screening procedures them-
selves. If the exclusion of susceptible, high risk individuals truly is a business necessity,
its rationale disappears if the test used as the basis for such exclusion cannot provide rea-
sonable assurance that those excluded are actually susceptible, i.e. at high risk. Indeed,
without such assurance, the test becomes little more than an instrument for arbitrariness
and only adds to the discriminatory nature of the exclusionary practice. As many screen-
ing tests are currently far from reliable, the availability of the business necessity defence
is questionable.
The foregoing discussion of discrimination has presupposed that the screened work-
er will be excluded from the workplace. Employers, however, may have another option.
In many cases, they may be in a position to provide these workers with other jobs in
workplaces that do not involve exposures to the substances from which they may suffer
adverse health effects. If such alternative positions were supplied, at benefit levels com-
parable to those of the positions from which exclusion was sought, employers might
avoid the proscriptions of the various discrimination laws. Providing an alternative posi-
tion would certainly remove much of the incentive for filing a discrimination claim.
Further, even if such a claim were filed, courts might find that an adequate MRP pro-
gramme obviated the charge of discrimination. This could be one area in which good law
and good social policy coincide.
N.A. Ashford: Scientific, ethical and legal challenges in genetic testing
53
The use of monitoring data in tort and workers’ compensation cases
From a legal perspective, the most important impact of human monitoring informa-
tion may be its use as evidence in tort and workers’ compensation cases. Although its
potential in this area is still to be realized, the science of biological markers may even-
tually serve to answer the evidentiary question that has plagued most compensation
cases involving human exposure to toxic substances: how do we know whether a par-
ticular exposure caused a particular person’s medical condition? At present, the prob-
lem remains a major one, except for exposure to a few substances, such as vinyl chlo-
ride and asbestos.
Obviously, to the extent that increased use of human monitoring adds to the existing
database on the observed correlations between particular diseases and particular chemi-
cals, it will provide increased evidence for use in compensation proceedings generally.
More than this, though, human monitoring has the potential to bring about a change in
the nature of the evidence used in these cases.
Typically, the evidence offered to prove causation in chemical exposure cases is
premised on a statistical correlation between disease and exposure. Whether the under-
lying data are from epidemiologic studies, from toxicological experiments, or from the
results of a complicated risk assessment model, they are usually population-based. This
places the plaintiff at the mercy of the attributable risk (expressed as the percentage of
cases of the disease attributable to the exposure) for the study population. Unless the
attributable risk is greater than 50% – that is, unless the incidence rate among those
exposed to the chemical is more than double the background rate – the plaintiff cannot
prove on the basis of the available statistical evidence, that it is more likely than not that
his or her particular case of the disease was caused by the chemical exposure.
The developing science of human monitoring may offer a way to distinguish individ-
ual claimants from the population at risk. Conceivably, the data generated by various
human monitoring procedures will:
– increase our knowledge of the “sub-clinical” effects of toxic substances, thus per-
mitting us to track the effect of a chemical exposure over time, and also expanding
the universe of “medical conditions” for which compensation may be provided;
– eventually enable us to establish that a particular person has been exposed to a par-
ticular chemical (or class of chemicals); and 
– eventually enable us to establish that a particular person’s medical condition (or
subclinical effect) was caused by exposure to a particular chemical (or class of
chemicals).
Already, human monitoring data are being used in some situations to identify sub-
clinical changes thought to be associated with particular chemical exposures. This can
have many applications in toxic substance compensation cases. In the long term, evi-
dence of subclinical changes occurring between the time of exposure and the time of dis-
ease may be a way of distinguishing those whose disease was caused by the exposure
from those who contracted the disease because of other factors. Such evidence may also
give rise to more immediate legal relief. There is a growing trend toward allowing those
who can establish that they have been exposed to a toxic substance – and thus that they
have been placed at increased risk of future harm – to recover the costs of medical sur-
veillance from the responsible party. Proof of certain subclinical effects, such as DNA
damage, would tend to support an allegation of increased risk, and would make the claim
for medical surveillance all the more compelling. Further, such evidence may support a
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separate claim for damages for having been put at increased risk of future harm, although
it is not clear that such a claim would be viable in most states.
Finally, some evidence of “subclinical” effects may give rise to a right to recover
compensation for those effects themselves. For example, human monitoring can detect
certain changes in the immune system. There is a body of literature suggesting that
chemical exposures can harm the immune system39, and evidence of immune system
damage has been offered in cases involving toxic substance exposure40. Thus far, allega-
tions of immune system damage have met with mixed success in the courts, both because
the relationship between chemical exposure and immune system damage is not yet clear,
and because the evidence of immune system damage was not always considered persua-
sive. Although human monitoring may not be able to tie particular immune system defi-
ciencies to particular exposures, it should be able to establish with greater certainty
whether immune system damage has, in fact, occurred.
Looking farther to the future, it is quite possible that further developments in the sci-
ence of biomarkers will permit the identification of “chemical fingerprints” – a distinc-
tive change in the DNA that can be linked with exposure to a particular chemical or class
of chemicals. At the very least, this should make it much easier to distinguish those who
have been exposed to a particular chemical in the workplace from those who have not,
and to identify which of the many potential defendants was responsible. More impor-
tantly, it should eventually permit the correlation of particular cases of diseases such as
cancer with exposure to particular chemicals (or classes of chemicals). To the extent that
this happens, it will narrow the scope of the evidence from the population to the indi-
vidual, and will place the deliberations in these cases on firmer scientific footing.
Positive uses of human monitoring in the workplace
The strategies used for human monitoring must be fashioned on a toxicant-specific
basis because the state-of-the-art techniques differ from substance to substance. In gen-
eral, medical surveillance and biologic or genetic monitoring for populations should be
used only in combination with environmental monitoring. In the case in which a specif-
ic harmful substance cannot be identified, however, and the workplace is suspected of
being unsafe, medical surveillance may indicate whether a problem exists. In the future,
genetic monitoring may serve as an early indicator that exposure to a certain chemical
has occurred in a worker population. However, the use of that kind of screening for this
purpose is in its infancy. Genetic screening focuses on removal of the worker before
exposure and is preventive for that worker only.
Human monitoring should be used only if: 1) given the specific workplace problem,
monitoring serves as an appropriate preventive tool; 2) it is used in conjunction with
environmental monitoring; 3) the test is accurate and reliable and the predictive value is
high; 4) monitoring is not used to divert resources from reducing the presence of the
toxic substance in the workplace or from modifying the hazardous technology; and 5)
medical removal protection for earnings and job security is provided. New solutions
involving both technologic innovation and job redesign may obviate the necessity of
human monitoring. Conflicts now arise only because, with existing technology, workers
continue to be exposed to toxic substances.
If conditions one through five are met, the question remains whether the employer is
obligated to remove the worker from the workplace. It would seem so, since the employ-
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er owes that duty of care to his or her employees. But what if the monitoring test is unre-
liable? The extent of the obligation would appear to be less, although the dissemination
of the test results to the worker arguably would still be required. Is the employer under
a greater or lesser obligation to remove the worker if he or she provides no earnings and
job security protection; greater, because it costs him or her nothing to protect the work-
er; or lesser because the worker is economically disadvantaged?
Finally, if a particular workplace cannot be made safer and the removal (and rota-
tion-replacement) of workers results in lower individual risk but greater total disease, is
this morally defensible? Exposure to radiation or some carcinogens can represent such a
situation. These are difficult questions that deserve careful consideration.
Solutions to the legal and ethical conflicts in the workplace
The extensive discussion in the previous section reveals the complexity and difficul-
ty with which the law balances competing interests and equities. In some cases, the law
embodies the belief that de facto discrimination against certain protected classes of peo-
ple (e.g. a minority race) is to be affirmatively avoided and cannot be justified by result-
ing health benefits. In other cases, such as those involving workers who are perceived as
handicapped, the burdens to industry of providing protection may be relevant in decid-
ing how much employment security to require. Discrimination law necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion by courts and adjudicating institutions – with its attendant
inconsistency and unpredictability.
Discriminatory practices and consequential tort suits, anti-discrimination suits, dete-
rioration of labour-management relations, and agency sanctions may follow poorly con-
ceived and poorly executed human monitoring programmes. The weaker the scientific
foundation for the monitoring test, the less secure are the legal grounds and defences
available to the employer. In light of the sometimes preliminary, unreliable and non-spe-
cific nature of many techniques used in human monitoring, the practice is a problemat-
ic activity itself in most instances.
With legal and ethical norms in flux, it is important to examine the policy options for
dealing with future and continuing ethical dilemmas. The possible strategies that deserve
consideration include:
1) encouragement of ethical enquiry in the conduct and use of medical screening and
testing, i.e., educating workers, management, and health professionals to think
more seriously about the problems – indeed, ethicists should be consulted in
designing the screening and testing programmes;
2) use of legislative and regulatory means to clarify rights and duties, such as encour-
aging OSHA in the United States to promulgate a generic earnings and job securi-
ty protection requirement for all cases of medical removal, or enacting legislation
that requires workers to be notified of occupational risks and prohibits discrimina-
tion outright;
3) encouragement of the use of self-help techniques by workers, such as union bar-
gaining, the filing of discrimination complaints, and the right to refuse hazardous
work;
4) encouragement of better disposition of conflicts by improving procedural fairness
in attempts at resolution, such as full and complete disclosure of information to
workers, the better maintenance of confidentiality of worker records, or the use of
corporate ombudspersons;
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5) encouragement of shared decision-making through joint health and safety committees.
These options differ in the extent to which the rights and freedoms of some are dimin-
ished to protect those of others. Regulatory or legislative fiats define acceptable behav-
iour and in the process, decrease freedom of choice. On the other hand, freedom from
harm and discrimination is preserved. Sharpening self-help mechanisms preserves
choice, but fosters an adversarial solution. Education can persuade and enlighten; it can
also sensitize the discriminated to assert their rights. Procedural fairness tends to right
the imbalance of access to legal and political institutions.
The choice of options at any one time reflects the seriousness with which society
wishes to address the moral and legal dilemmas. Thinking about these problems is a first
and necessary step41-44.
Finally, there is an obvious additional rôle for government in addressing the follow-
ing unresolved issues:
– what additional legislative/regulatory protections need to be in place to ensure the
right to privacy?
– how are competing requests by potential subjects (workers) for study to be decided?
– if there is a significant risk to the subject, how can an independent risk-benefit eval-
uation be done?
– is there a need for a national panel/regulatory body to comment on acceptable bio-
markers/tests?
– how can appropriate worker participation be ensured in governmental delibera-
tions?
– in some state jurisdictions, information derived from biological monitoring inves-
tigations may be used to impose liability on employers and others in order to com-
pensate exposed individuals, thus creating a disincentive to undertake monitoring;
to the extent that there may be a need to encourage more study and application of
biomarkers, how should this conflict of social goals be addressed?
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 only begins to answer some
of these concerns.
In 1998 during the Clinton Administration, the Department of Health and Human
Services created the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing. Their prelim-
inary report issued on April 1, 2000 echoed the cautions of previous commentators con-
cerning limitations of the evolving science and inadequacy of protective standards45. The
committee’s charter was allowed to expire and a new committee, the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society was formed in the George W.
Bush Administration.
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